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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces a semi-automated technique for classifying text-based close call reports from the 
GB railway industry. The classification schema uses natural language processing techniques to classify 
close call reports in accordance with the threat pathways shown on bow-tie diagrams. The method 
enables categorisation of a very large number of unstructured text documents where safety-related 
information has not previously been extracted due to the infeasibility of analysis by human readers. The 
results demonstrate mixed accuracy in the categorisation of close calls, with the highest accuracy being 
for the threat pathways that are more frequently reported. This work paves the way to machine-assisted 
analysis of text-based safety and risk databases, and provides a step forward in the introduction of data 
analytics in the safety and risk domain. Others working in this area have speculated that approaches such 
as this could be mandatory for safety management in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents a hazard reporting and safety management method that has been developed for the 
railways in Great Britain (the GB railways). The method aligns aggregated data from free-text hazard 
reports provided by workers with the bow-tie accident causation models that are used by the railways. 
Since the hazard reports had not previously been used in this way, the new method demonstrates the 
possibility for valuable new source of information to be used for safety management which, in turn, allows 
for improved management of safety risks. 
 
Railways around the world invariably have formal reporting mechanisms to record accidents. These 
records are analysed to gather information about the hazards that led to the accidents and provide 
recommendations to prevent recurrence of similar events. In addition to such an accident reporting 
system, the GB railway industry provides a formal mechanism for workers to report safety hazards even 
without an accident having occurred, so called close calls. Since the close call reporting system provides 
information on the hazards before injury or damage occurs, it provides a valuable complement to an 
accident reporting system. 
 
The close call reporting mechanism used by the GB railways allows workers to report by sending an email 
message or by directly entering textual descriptions of hazards into a mobile phone app. This free-text 
reporting method allows workers to describe hazards that they encounter on the railways without being 
constrained to pre-existing risk categories, such as systems that use drop-down lists. It also allows 
workers to report whatever information is relevant to the hazard. Workers are able to describe complex 
sequences of causation and nuances that would not be feasible with a system that did not allow free-text. 
Similarly, free-text reporting allows workers to report on emerging hazards that may not be listed in a 
drop-down list, for example hazards associated with emerging technology that were not known about at 
the time a drop-down list was developed. 
 
Since implementing the system, the GB railways have obtained a very rich source of information regarding 
hazards on the railway, with workers reporting approximately 200,000 close calls per year. With such a 
high volume of data, it is impractical for railway safety managers to obtain an overview of hazards on the 
railway by manually reading each record. Without an automated process to support the aggregation of 
data, it is likely that trends in hazards remain undetected. A major impediment to automatically 
aggregating information from close call records is that the free-text reporting method means that workers 
can provide many different descriptions of similar types of hazard, which can make it difficult to 
automatically aggregate hazard information to obtain an overview of trends in hazards. A further 
impediment is that workers using the mobile phone app enter text on a small touch-screen which is 
vulnerable to mistyping, especially if the workers have cold or gloved hands. Therefore, while the data 
source has the potential to provide valuable safety information, currently no exhaustive learning is being 
propagated through the railway's management systems to improve safety of the railway. 
 
The GB railways have an extensive safety management system, which includes the use of bow-tie 
diagrams to model potential accident causation; understand hazards on the railway; assess how the 
hazards can lead to accidents; and identify suitable controls to manage the risk. Since close calls provide 
valuable information on hazards on the railway, an ambition of the railway's safety management process 
is to aggregate information from the close calls in a way that integrates with the existing bow-tie diagrams. 
In such a system the railway would be able to identify trends in hazards and the risk controls that are 
breaking down. Furthermore there is the possibility that there may be close calls describing hazards that 
have not been identified and are therefore not managed within the railway's safety management. 
Integrating close call information with bow-tie diagrams again provides a valuable opportunity to identify 
improvements to the existing safety management system. To address this need, this paper introduces a 
safety management to extract safety-relevant information from close call records so that the records can 
be categorised according to the structure of an existing bow-tie diagram; no process is know that currently 
performs this task. The method proposed in this paper uses an iterative process between a safety 
specialist and automated text analysis techniques  
 
The process presented in this paper seeks use the rich source of data provided by workers in a way that 
integrates with the railway's existing management systems to improve safety. Since no fully automated 
process is known that can perform this task, the proposed method uses semi-automated natural language 
processing (NLP) techniques that rely on an iterative process between a human user and a computer to 
develop a categorisation schema for records. The method is illustrated by a case study for worker slip, trip 
or fall (STF) events which are common accidents to which all workers on the railway are exposed. A 
contribution of this paper is that it brings together close call reporting, use of bow-tie diagrams for safety 
management and natural language processing to inform safety management processes in a way that has 
not been possible until now. 
 Section 2 of this paper describes the background of close call reporting, the use of bow-tie diagrams for 
safety analysis, and NLP. Section 3 sets out the classification method used in the case study. Section 4 
presents the results: the hazard trends identified based on the bow-tie diagram. Section 5 discusses the 
results and potentials for further development; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical background 
 
The theoretical background to this work is derived from three different areas of research: reporting close 
calls as a part of a safety management system; use of bow-tie diagrams to understand risks to safety; and 
natural language processing to extract information from text. The following sections discuss these areas of 
research. No prior work has been found that merges these three concepts. 
 
2.1 Close call reporting 
 
A close call is “a hazardous situation where the event sequence could lead to an accident if it had not 
been interrupted by a planned intervention or by random event” (Gnoni, Andriulo et al. 2013, Andriulo and 
Gnoni 2014). The concept of identifying close calls, near misses or no-injury accidents to improve safety 
by intervening before an accident is observed goes back to Heinrich (1929). In 1958 Lateiner posited that 
safety-related incidents could be compared to an iceberg: incidents that result in damage or injuries are 
only the visible proportion of all incidents; no-injury accidents, whilst larger in number, remain invisible but 
should nevertheless be actively investigated as a proactive approach to preventing accidents. The 
concept that no-injury events, near misses and close calls are invaluable information has continued to be 
upheld by safety researchers who generally agree that action taken to prevent close calls will necessarily 
result in a reduction in accidents (Bird and Germain 1966, Petersen 1971, Wright and Van der Schaaf 
2004, Gnoni and Lettera 2012). This concept is supported by Gnoni and Lettera (2012) who assert that 
close calls and serious accidents at major hazard facilities both have the same underlying causes. An 
inverse relationship between near miss reports and accidents at Norsk Hydro industrial plant between 
1985 and 1997 was demonstrated by Jones (1999). 
 
Despite the benefits available from collecting close call information, the process is not without problems. 
As well as suffering from traditional impediments to reporting, such as fear of disciplinary retaliation, close 
call reporting can suffer from additional impediments since the reporting process may be 
disproportionately time consuming and suffer from a lack of feedback to workers reporting hazards. Any 
close call reporting system needs to be carefully designed system to allow extraction of sensible learning 
(Cambraia et al. 2010). 
 
Another difficulty is the question of how to assess the seriousness of a close call. Cambraia et al. (2010) 
and Gnoni and Lettera (2012) have used an elaborate semi-quantitative method to assess the 
seriousness of close calls based on the risk matrix to establish whether safety interventions would be 
justified. Disseminating information on near misses and close calls also raises problems; work by Dillon 
and Tinsley (2008) shows that workers with knowledge of near misses actually undertake in riskier 
behaviour because they develop a mindset of counterfactuals that suggests hazards do not often 
materialize into accidents. Bliss et al. (2014) summarize seven problems that impede the development of 
a sensible near-miss system: development of a theoretical model for close calls; leveraging the use of 
close calls; management of progression and actions based on close calls; training to optimize benefits 
from close calls; separating close calls and false alarms; experiencing the gravity of a close call for people 
not involved in the incident; and quantification of the close call severity. 
 
In general, the available literature on close calls considers only safety management systems that have not 
benefitted from the widespread introduction of a digital reporting system that is open to all workers in the 
industry. Rather, the projects described usually have relatively small numbers of close-calls: Gnoni and 
Lettera (2012) consider just 11 close call reports in an undisclosed period of time; Cambraia et al. 
consider 122 reports in eight months. The much larger source of data considered by Jones contains 
approximately 4000 records that were collected over seven years. Given these potential benefits, the work 
described in this paper seeks to use the railway's close call database, which is currently being populated 
with approximately 200,000 close calls reports annually, in a way that improves the safety of the railway 
for all workers. This volume of information provides a benefit and a challenge to safety management: with 
such a large number of records, there is a rich source of valuable information. Conversely extracting 
relevant information can be difficult. 
 
2.2 Bow-tie diagrams as safety analysis tools 
 
Bow-tie diagrams illustrate the direct relationships between hazards, tasks, safety controls, risks, and the 
potential outcomes of accidents. Since their creation by Nielsen (1971), bow-tie diagrams have supported 
safety management in a wide range of industries but particularly in the process industries (Visser 1998, 
Cameron 2005, Hudson 2010). As powerful safety management tools, earlier researchers have described 
using bow-tie diagrams for modelling hazards related to human factors (Targoutzidis 2008) and for using 
bow-tie diagrams to manage multiple, possibly conflicting, objectives such as "maximizing effectiveness, 
reliability and availability and minimizing the global cost of all barriers" (Badreddine et al. 2014). Recently 
the railways in Britain have integrated bow-tie diagrams into their safety management system (Turner et 
al. 2015). The railway infrastructure manager has developed a suite of bow-tie diagrams that identify 
business-critical rules and how they influence operational risks. 
 
Our work uses the railway's existing bow-tie diagrams to provide a framework for classifying information 
extracted from close call reports. Close calls give an indication of which hazards are most prevalent on a 
day-to-day basis within the GB railways. Linking information from close call reports to the bow-tie 
diagrams provides a method of feedback on safety performance that is directly correlated with the process 
that is used to monitor and review the safety management system. This paper uses a case study based 
on the railway's bow-tie diagram for worker slip, trip and fall (STF) events. 
 
2.3 Analysing close calls using NLP techniques 
 
Manual analysis of free-text close calls places a considerable demand for resources on an organisation, 
however the effort required can be reduced by applying semi-automated techniques (Popping 2000, Xu et 
al. 2010). Popping describes three approaches for analysing text: thematic, semantic, and network 
approaches. The thematic approach is the simplest but is nevertheless powerful and effective for safety 
learning (Hughes et al. 2015). Using this approach records are categorised according to characteristic 
tokens that occur in the text; a token could be a single word, a consecutive sequence of two words 
(a bigram) such as level crossing, or any number of consecutive words (an n-gram). The approach 
requires development of a list of domain-specific tokens that can be used identify key information in the 
source text. In some cases tokens may be sufficient by themselves to identify the theme of a text record, 
in general however, a number of tokens are usually required to provide reliable categorisation of a record 
into a particular theme. A very similar method was employed by Tixier et al. (2016) who noted that 
"although this approach is simple, it is very powerful". An important difference is that the study described 
in this paper is not looking simply to find what categories of incident can be found in the text records, 
rather in this study there are pre-defined categories of incidents described in the bow-tie diagram. 
 
Regardless of the approach used to extract meaning from text, there are no fully autonomous methods 
available that can take only text as an input and provide categorisations, abstractions or any other 
knowledge as an output (Tixier et al., 2016). Unsupervised methods exist for detecting patterns in text 
based on the occurrence of words such as k-means clustering (Manning and Schütze, 1999) or Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation (Blei et al. 2003). These methods allow documents to be grouped into themes; but they 
provide no understanding of what the themes relate to (Noel et al. 2014). By themselves words are merely 
labels for objects and events that occur in the real world. Whilst software agents can perform 
mathematical pattern matching on words, software that has not experienced the real world cannot 
understand the meaning of the words; meaning arises from the interpretation of words in the mind of a 
reader. 
 
Classification of natural language is not a task that can be performed in the absence of an understanding 
of the purpose of the classification activity (Li, 2015). The corpus of close call records contains a large 
number of records that could be categorised in many ways. In addition to categorising close call records 
by the nature of the safety hazard being described, other groupings are also possible such as: length of 
the record (some close calls are only a few words, some are hundreds); style of writing (some close calls 
use many abbreviations and railway-specific terms, others use none or hardly any); or by dialect 
differences (workers submitting close calls in northern Britain use different terms to workers in the south). 
An unsupervised software agent could not be expected to guess what method of categorisation is required 
by the human operator without some form of guidance on what information is being sought. Even when 
supervised machine methods are used to extract information from natural language, such as the use of 
artificial neural networks, the quality of the results can be varied and in some cases extensive human 
input is required to obtain acceptable outcomes (Mou et al. 2016). An analogous problem arises with the 
development of ontologies for categorisation of natural language; Ruiz-Martínez et al. (2011) note the 
need for manual intervention in the ontology learning process since "techniques for learning domain 
ontologies from free natural language text have important drawbacks". The consensus in the literature is 
that developing the correct rules for extracting information from text is an incremental process (Sánchez 
Ruenes, 2007), with no perfect solution classification systems have to be developed that are fit for a 
specific purpose (van Gulijk et al. 2016). 
 
3. Categorisation of close call records 
 
This paper treats a case study of a worker slip trip and fall (STF) bow-tie diagram. To aggregate 
information from the close call records in a way that supports integration with the railway's safety 
management system, each close call record was examined to determine how it corresponded with 
descriptions of hazards, controls or threat pathways on the STF bow-tie diagram. Bow-tie diagrams are in 
integral part of the railway's safety management system and are a rich source of information on the 
controls each place for each loss-of-control (LOC) event. Figure 1 provides an overview of the railway's 
slip, trip or fall bow-tie diagram. At the left-hand side of the diagram are six initiating conditions (hazards): 
missing safety equipment; poor underfoot conditions; human error; poor visibility; unsuitable or poor 
footwear; and poor housekeeping. On the threat pathways between the initiating events and the LOC 
event are a number of barriers which are each represented on the diagram with double triangle. The 
barriers are the risk control that are intended to prevent the initiating events leading to the LOC event; for 
each barrier there will be corresponding details in the railway's safety management system describing the 
control, how it is implemented and monitored.  
 
On the right-hand side of the diagram possible outcomes of the LOC event are shown. In general these 
outcomes can be any outcome including adverse financial impacts, loss or reputation or legal sanctions 
subsequent to an accident. For this case study only outcomes directly resulted to injury to people were 
considered. Again there are barriers that can prevent the LOC event leading to undesired outcomes. 
Close call events typically report the presence of initiating events, with reference to Figure 1, a close call 
may report an instance of a worker on site with inadequate footwear. Alternatively a close call record may 
report failures of barriers; for example inadequate lighting on site, or the lack of a suitably trained first-
aider. In either case, the close call report does not state that an LOC event occurred, nor that an 
undesired outcome occurred, instead the close call report describes the instances of circumstances where 
such events may occur. 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Overview of STF bow-tie diagram 
 
To perform the analysis, all close call reports from 01 October 2013 to 28 February 2015 were extracted 
from the database: a total of 219,231 records. Example records are shown in Table 1. 
 
Operatives found working on the east platform with insufficient barriers to 
protect the public from the work site. Members of the public could have strayed 
into the work area<br /><div></div><!-- RICH TEXT --> 
Portmill Station Machine/crane Falkirk TGM no identity badge 
worn. Operatives/Supervision unclear whom was directing RRV. 
reported by A global operative Lap 5-283 - loc 124 (SWB 1084E3) cable damage 
seen as cable emerge from the trough route. SSL/BCM to rectify asap 
Don�t walk By Draw s on QJB project have not happened for over 6 months. 
Reported on Previous DWB s 
Table 1: Example records from the railway’s database of close call records 
 
The close call reports generally report hazards that could lead to safety-related incidents, although some 
reports do describe health hazards, such as exposure to asbestos. 
 
The process was carried out broadly in accordance with the process set out in Hughes et al. 2015, viz.: 
Step 1: text pre-processing; 
Step 2: interactive token selection; 
Step 3: record selection; and 
Step 4: post-processing.  
These steps are described in the following sections and illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
  
 
Figure 2: overview of the text extraction process 
 
3.1 Step 1: pre-processing 
 
The close call records imported from the database contain a number of coding artefacts that are not 
needed to extract information on safety hazards. The example records in Table 1 include the following 
examples of text: <br /> <div> </div> <!-- RICH TEXT -->, and an occurrence of the character 
� in place of an apostrophe (’). These data artefacts are unnecessary since they do not provide 
information useful for safety analysis and can interfere with NLP processes. As a pre-processing step, 
Java software was written employing regular expression functionality (Thompson, 1968) to cleanse the 
source data. The software imported the source data, searched for occurrences of unwanted text elements 
and either removed the unwanted text or, where it was possible to determine with a high degree of 
confidence what the correct text should be, substituted the text with corrected data. The cleansed text was 
exported to a new file. 
 
3.2 Step 2: interactive token selection 
 
To identify tokens the source records were filtered to select only those that had been categorised at the 
time of entry as relating to worker STFs. From this subset of records, n-grams (consecutive sequences of 
words) were identified in the text in the new file. Unlike the work of Tixier et al. (2016) where tokens were 
identified through a manual review of records, for this study the Java software was used to extract all 1- to 
5-grams (sequences of one to five words) from the corpus of records and sort them by frequency of 
occurrence. For this work, an point followed by a space (. ) was considered to mark the end of a sentence; 
n-grams were not considered to flow over sentences. Tokens are used to identify commonly occurring 
terms in the text that are meaningful to safety management; for example n-grams such as trip hazard and 
pit cover occur frequently in the text and are instances where two consecutive words (a two-gram) are 
required to describe a single concept. In performing this task it is necessary to understand the domain of 
railway operations and safety management in order to identify n-grams that are relevant to identify 
hazards. 
 
A railway safety specialist manually reviewed and selected the subset of n-grams that would be most 
useful as tokens for characterising the close call records on each threat pathway on the bow-tie diagram; 
each threat pathway could be identified by several n-grams. The selection of tokens is a manual process 
since it requires knowledge of the domain and what information is relevant for safety management. Since 
natural language contains synonyms it is necessary to identify a number of terms that occur in free-text 
that can be mapped to a single token; for example two terms that occur commonly in close call reports 
are: slippery underfoot conditions and icy walking conditions. Whilst these terms contain different words 
and different nuances, within the context of managing safety hazards on the railway they have largely the 
same meaning: namely that the hazard relates to a potential for an STF event due to the condition of the 
walking surface. Similarly, identification of tokens for analysing free-text must allow for commonly 
occurring spelling variations. For example within the railway close calls corpus, the words slippery and 
slippy are both used commonly to convey the same meaning. Furthermore close call records entered via 
the mobile phone app contain many spelling variations as workers may be outside or working in cold 
conditions or with gloved hands. However selection of terms must discriminate carefully where small 
differences in spelling can have a large impact on meaning, for example within close call reports the term 
m.o.p. is commonly used as an abbreviation for member of the public; whilst the similarly spelled m.o.m. 
refers to a mobile operations manager. Both terms refer to a type of person, and therefore automatic 
language processing techniques may identify that the properties of an m.o.p. and an m.o.m. are similar; 
however in terms of railway safety management the terms represent different concepts and therefore they 
cannot be considered synonyms in this context. 
 
The process of token selection was performed iteratively: the software was initially run to identify common 
n-grams from the full corpus of records. The safety specialist identified those n-grams which would be 
used to select close call records relating to each threat pathway. Having identified candidate n-grams; a 
subset of close call records was extracted with only those records that contained the n-gram (for example 
only records containing the term pit cover) was extracted, the process of n-gram identification was then 
repeated on the subset to identify any further n-grams that were considered relevant for the threat 
pathways. This process allowed the analyst in selecting n-grams when there are large number of 
frequently occurring terms that are not useful for identifying safety hazards; for example the following two-
grams occurring frequently in all records: to the, in the, was in. These example two-grams occur frequently 
in close call records regardless of what hazard is being described and are not valuable for identifying 
hazards on any particular threat pathway in the STF bow-tie diagram. During the iterative process, the n-
gram set was tested on sample records to determine its effectiveness at correctly identifying records; the 
results were reviewed to determine whether records were accurately selected using the n-grams. The 
process of n-gram selection was repeated until an acceptable set of tokens was achieved. 
 
Table 2 shows examples of the n-grams that were selected to identify records belonging to each of the 
threat pathways. The table shows that there are variations in the terms that are used by workers when 
describing concepts, for example the terms over grown, overgrown, and over-grown all occur within the 
source text. 
 
Threat 
pathway 
Example n-grams used to classify 
record 
 
missing 
safety 
equipment 
defect 
defective 
missing 
with no 
no cover 
knocked off 
not properly secured 
... 
underfoot 
conditions 
uneven 
rough 
surface 
slippery 
slippy 
rainy 
rain 
raining 
snow 
... 
human error forgot 
forget 
not looking 
... 
poor visibility overgrown 
over grown 
over-grown 
vegetation 
fog 
foggy 
visibility 
... 
unsuitable or 
poor footwear 
footwear 
foot wear 
foot-wear 
boots 
shoe 
shoelace 
shoe lace 
poor 
housekeeping 
loose 
untidy 
messy 
left on 
left by 
trip over 
step over 
was left 
scrap 
rubbish 
... 
Table 2: Example tokens used to identify each threat pathway 
 
Using this process it is clear that a record could be categorised to more than one threat pathway, for 
example a record that contained both the tokens footwear and uneven surfaces would be 
categorised to both the unsuitable or poor footwear threat pathway and the underfoot conditions threat 
pathway. Such an outcome is meaningful and is not deficiency in the process. Whilst the bow-tie diagram 
is structured to consider each threat pathway as distinct a distinct sequence to a worker STF event, in 
reality this may not be the case. A hazard could occur on the railway as a result of a combination of 
missing safety equipment, poor underfoot conditions, and human error. Railway workers may use the 
close call system to report any hazards on the railway and the free-text reporting permitted by the close 
call system does not constrain workers to report only one hazard per record. A worker may use the 
system to report multiple hazards that have occurred at different locations and at different times. As such 
it is meaningful that a close call report could describe hazards in any number of threat pathways. 
 
Since the token identification is based on the structure of the bow-tie diagram, the hazards that are 
identified from the close call reports are only those that are described on the bow-tie. Close call records 
that relate to hazards that are not described in an existing bow-tie diagram may not be detected using this 
method. The case study described in this paper considers the worker STF bow-tie diagram, however a 
complete implementation of the process could be expected to consider all bow-tie diagrams used by the 
railway. Records that do not contain tokens relating to any bow-tie diagram could be identified and either 
reviewed manually, or analysed by software that identified commonly occurring n-grams, in order to 
identify hazards on the railway that are not described in the bow-tie diagrams and may therefore not have 
controls within the railway's safety management system. 
 
3.3 Step 3: record selection 
 
The close call records and selected tokens were provided as input to software that selected records and 
categorised each record to a number of threat pathways based on the presence of tokens in the records. 
The process of categorisation took approximately 15 seconds on a standard desktop computer to 
categorise the full corpus of close call records, or approximately 15,000 records per second. For 
comparison, a human reader could be expected to read and categorise approximately five close call 
records per minute, and would therefore take approximately 100 working days. During such a task it 
cannot be expected that a human reader would categorise records consistently. If the task were shared 
among a number of readers it can again be expected that there would be variations between the 
categorisation used by each reader. 
 
3.3 Step 4: post-processing 
 
After the process of categorisation, the number of close call records in each threat pathway was counted 
for each calendar month and the result was presented graphically in format based on the existing 
precursor indicator model used by the GB railways (RSSB 2015). 
 
4. Results 
 
The tokenisation process identified records corresponding to each of the threat pathways. Examples of 
close call records that were categorised to each threat pathway are shown in Table 3. The results in the 
table show demonstrate how records can be identified based on the simple token set, for instance 
considering the results the example tokens in Table 2, it can be seen that the token missing in result 1a 
indicates where safety equipment (in this case a handrail) is absent. The results for threat pathway 1 show 
that the results can identify failures of different types of safety equipment, including a handrail, a pit cover, 
and a bearer. These results have been obtained because of similarity in the terms used to describe failed 
safety equipment, rather than similarity in the terms used to described different types of safety equipment. 
It can also be seen that some of the records may correspond to more than one threat pathway. For 
example result 3b in Table 3 describes two hazards: a human error where matting had not been replaced, 
and icy conditions. Using this tokenisation technique the event would be counted as both a human error 
hazard and an underfoot conditions hazard. 
 
Threat pathway Exemplar close call records matching each threat pathway 
1 missing safety 
equipment 
a. Handrail missing on stairs to project office. 
b. operatives working around broken pit cover could have 
fallen and sustained injury 
c. bearers rotted and broken could have caused slips and 
falls, rrv could have fall over. 
2 underfoot 
conditions 
a. Snow and ice on steps to project office, handrail not safe 
and needs to be repared. 
b. Access to the carpark is only possible over uneven and 
rough ground – one staff got his foot stuck in rabbit hole. 
c. walking route around site has many hazards and need to be 
cleared up – rubbish and shotgun cartridge found and 
walking is on slippery ground 
3 human error a. During site briefing the site supervisor forget to mention 
the icy conditions – could have cause slip trip fall. 
b. cleaning staff omitted to replace nonslip matting at the 
entrance to sm office risk to staff and public – icy 
condition underfoot could cause slip fall hazard 
4 poor visibility a. Night work on site with inadequate lighting – safe walk 
route not visible. 
b. The path leading to the worksite was overgrown – vegetetion 
needs to be cleared before staff are sent to site. 
c. working in fog, operatives were too far away to see 
lookout, also poor walking conditions could have slipped. 
5 unsuitable or 
poor footwear 
a. contractors on site without proper ppe –not wearing 
approved harnesses or safety boots 
b. on going into the signalbox the signaller was wearing flip 
flops which is unsuitable footware for any working 
environment could easily have sutbbed his toe or other 
c. Staff provided with unsuitable ppe boots – cannot be 
properly laced up leading to potential for slip trip fall. 
6 poor 
housekeeping 
a. build up of rubbish and and scrap materials at south end of 
carpark – unsafe access to site and trip hazard 
b. Extension leads have been left trailing across boards 
causing a trip hazard, operative could have tripped 
c. Gas bottles not stored propely, walking access past crane, 
storage area needs better organising, tripping hazards 
(timber, steel rebar etc). 
Table 3: Exemplar close calls found for each threat pathway 
 
Figure 3 shows the numbers of close call records categorised to each threat pathway by the month when 
the close call was reported. These results show that poor housekeeping and poor underfoot conditions are 
the most commonly reported causes of worker STF hazards on the railway. The dip in reporting STF 
hazards during August and September is consistent with an overall reduction of close calls reported in 
these months, which in turn corresponds with a popular holiday time when fewer overall hours are worked 
on the railway. The threat pathway missing safety equipment is not expected to necessarily be seasonal 
and similarly does not show any distinct seasonal variation. The variation in the numbers of close calls 
reporting poor housekeeping varies in part with the overall numbers of close calls being reported, however 
it also shows a slowly increasing overall trend, which can also be seen in the total numbers of close calls 
being reported. The exact causes of the variations in the numbers of close calls being reported are a 
matter for safety management activities to understand the nature of the underlying hazards and put in 
place controls to reduce the risk. 
 
 
Figure 3: Count of close calls per month assigned to each threat pathway 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Applicability of the technique 
 
The results show that overall the technique has the ability to categorise close call reports consistently with 
threat pathways shown on the railway's bow-tie diagrams. In this way, railway safety managers have the 
ability to understand hazards on the railway in a way that integrates with the existing safety management 
system. It is possible to identify hazards that occur most frequently and the risk controls that are breaking 
down. The technique provides insight not only into hazards that are occurring but, as a corollary, where 
hazards are not occurring. Such insight – provided directly by workers who are using risk controls as part 
of their day-to-day work – gives information that can strengthen the safety management system. The 
information from this technique can support other direct sources of information from the railway including 
site inspections, audits, and incident investigations. Following application of a similar approach in the 
construction industry, Tixier et al. (2016) consider that "the use of NLP may soon become mandatory and 
widespread in construction management to make sense of the ever-growing amount of digital 
information". As software for performing NLP becomes increasingly available, safety managers within the 
GB railways may be similarly become obliged to adopt this technique in order to demonstrate that their 
safety management systems are compliance with industry best practice. 
 
The case study demonstrated in this paper was limited to a single LOC event: worker STF, however the 
technique could be applied to every one of the railway's bow-tie diagrams. Such an application would 
have the benefit of identifying close calls that are not categorised to any threat pathway on any bow-tie. 
The technique lends itself to iteration on this subset of close calls in accordance with the process 
described in Section 3.2. Repeating the token identification process on close calls that have not been 
categorised would identify new tokens that may enhance the tokens sets to improve categorisation to 
existing bow-tie diagrams. Alternatively the tokens identified from non-categorised records may indicate 
the presence of hazards that are not considered in the railway's safety management system. Such an 
application would provide a powerful new source of information for the railway. 
 
5.2 Allocation of close calls to threat pathways 
 
The results show that whilst the process is relatively simple in terms of detecting the occurrence of tokens 
in close call reports, the process can nevertheless detect a significant number of close calls and 
categorise them to a corresponding threat pathway. There are two key attributes that are relevant to the 
categorisation of close calls to bow-tie threat pathways: precision and accuracy of the results. Precision 
refers to the granularity with which close call records can be categorised to threat pathways in the bow-tie 
diagram. The process used in this paper considers six threat pathways, which provides more insight for 
safety management than an alternative method that might categorise close calls to only the bow-tie 
diagram that they correspond to. In some cases it is possible to categorise a close call record to a single 
risk control (i.e. an individual node on the bow-tie diagram). For example close call records that report 
broken handrail and handrail falling off can be mapped to the individual node that shows 
handrails as a control to reduce STF risk. In general, however, close calls may report only the presence of 
hazards and not failures of specific risk controls. Some of the risk controls on the bow-tie diagram relate to 
organisational factors such as performance monitoring and auditing, whereas close call records generally 
describe immediate hazards in the workplace which are usually physical conditions. It is therefore 
considered that the close call records do not lend themselves to greater precision than an individual threat 
pathway. Greater coverage of the bow-tie might be achieved if additional data sources, such as audit 
reports, were included in the analysis. 
 
Accuracy describes the degree to which the selection schema assigned records to the correct threat 
pathway. A validation was performed to test the level of agreement between the categorisation of a 
human safety analyst and this fairly straightforward NLP-based process. One hundred close call records 
were randomly selected and categorised by the safety analyst; this categorisation was assumed to be 
entirely accurate and was the baseline against which the NLP categorisation was evaluated. During this 
process the safety analyst noted that some of the records did not relate to worker STF hazards. The 
automated categorisation of the same records was then compared to the human categorisation to 
determine the number of correct results; the outcome is shown in Table 4. 
 
Categorisation Correct Incorrect 
Record does not relate to worker STF event 10 5 
Human Error 0 3 
Missing Safety Equipment 4 10 
Poor Housekeeping 31 8 
Underfoot Conditions 20 9 
Table 4: accuracy of the current NLP-based assignment on a sample of 100 records 
 
This small sample shows a significant level of incorrect categorisation: 35% error rate against the human 
analyst baseline. However this error rate is not constant across the threat pathways: human error and 
missing safety equipment show considerable levels of disagreement, whereas poor housekeeping and 
underfoot conditions show better correlation. The accuracy rates compares poorly with that reported by 
Tixier et al. who aimed for 95% accuracy; however there is a fundamental difference between the studies 
in that Tixier's work sought only to identify categories of incidents from the data that were available. 
Conversely the study described in this paper contained an important constraint that records must be 
categorised to events that are described on the bow-tie diagram. 
 
5.3 Limitations and further improvements 
 
These errors in categorisation are likely to reflect the limitations of the thematic approach used, namely 
that categories are identified only on the basis of the occurrence of specific tokens in the text. The results 
show that poor housekeeping and underfoot conditions can be most readily characterised by a relatively 
simple set of tokens, whereas human error is a complex cause of hazards with a wide context that 
requires a complex suite of tokens for correct identification. With fewer close call records being reported in 
these categories there is a smaller pool of records to define a suitable set of tokens. Further refinement to 
the selection of tokens would be likely to lead to improved accuracy on this sample of results but may 
result in overfitting that reduces the overall accuracy of the results. Overfitting is an effect that occurs 
when general selection rules have been trained to correctly match a sample of data with high accuracy, 
but are too specific to achieve high accuracy on a general sample of results. With sufficiently careful 
selection of tokens, it would be possible to identify token sets that provide 100% accuracy for the tested 
sample. Such a specific set of tokens, however, would be extremely unlikely to be generally useful for all 
close calls due to the fact that they had been selected from only a small sample of records. 
 
Another shortcoming of the thematic approach is that it is not able to efficiently detect negation. The 
thematic approach matches records based solely on the presence of tokens, regardless of the context in 
which the tokens occur. For example the following sentences contain exactly the same words, but have 
opposite meanings: 
 The road was icy and not in good condition. 
 The road was in good condition and not icy. 
 
By dint of having the same words, these two sentences are equivalent in terms of thematic analysis. 
Moving from a thematic approach to a semantic approach for NLP of close call records could improve the 
accuracy of the process significantly. As well as identifying negation, a thematic approach may be 
valuable to synonym resolution, for example to detect where the word foot is used to describe a unit of 
measurement, and where it is used to describe a body part. Such a modification presents a significant 
complication to the NLP process and is an avenue of research we are currently exploring. 
 
An important factor that influences the accuracy of the results is the degree to which the analyst identified 
appropriate token sets for each threat pathway, and in particular appropriated synonyms and spelling 
variations for important terms. This tasks is complicated by the many variations in spelling and use of 
abbreviations in the free-text provided by railway workers. For example analysis of close call records has 
found the following variations of the word palisade: 
 palasaid 
 palasaide 
 palicade 
 palilsade 
 palisadade 
 paliside 
 palistrade 
 pallasade 
 pallasde 
 pallaside 
 
Similarly the term British Transport Police occurs commonly in close call records but is also abbreviated in 
a number of ways: 
 B.T.P. 
 B.T.P 
 BTP. 
 BTP 
 b.t.p 
 B.t.p 
 btp 
 BT.Police 
 B.T.Police 
 BT Police 
 
Incorporating probabilistic techniques such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei et al. 2003) to support the 
selection of tokens may result in improved token sets for identification of records to a threat pathway. 
 
The case study used in this work aggregated close calls only by the month in which the close call 
reported, which is consistent with the railway's existing safety monitoring processes. A further 
enhancement to the process could be to report geographical trends in close call reports by threat 
pathway, and to normalise by hours worked on particular tasks. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper introduces a semi-automated technique for classifying text-based close call reports in 
accordance with the structure of an existing bow-tie diagram and is currently being adopted by the GB 
railway industry. Due to the difficulty in aggregating information from the large number of records that are 
reported, no existing system is in place to provide classification of close calls. The technique therefore 
unlocks the information from close call records support safety management of the railway in a way that 
was not previously possible. The information obtained from the technique allows an understanding of the 
relative occurrence of hazard on the railway and can therefore help direct safety managers to address 
higher risk. The technique also allows the identification of trends in the numbers of close calls being 
reported and can therefore help identify where hazards are becoming more prevalent. 
 
The limited accuracy of the results demonstrates that it would be unsafe to commit to safety management 
activities based solely on the results of this analysis. At this stage it is not yet clear whether the accuracy 
is a fundamental limit of the nature of close call reporting, however it is expected that greater accuracy 
can be achieved with more advanced text analysis techniques; semantic text analysis approaches are 
currently being trialled. Despite the limited accuracy of the results, the technique is able to provide new 
information that has not previously been possible. Information on trends and the relative occurrences of 
hazards on the railway can be valuable to safety management of the railway so long as the management 
processes for committing resources are away of the limitations of the results. 
 
Despite the results being fairly coarse, the case study demonstrates that even fairly straightforward NLP 
processes can be an asset for detecting some hazard trends, as well as changes in those trends. Where 
the technique can be applied to reliably detect hazards, the process can be used to complement existing 
safety management activities. Whilst the paper presents a case study within the railway industry, it is 
expected that the technique could be generally applied across other industries. Tixer et al. have 
speculated use of NLP techniques for safety management may become mandatory for the construction 
industry. With the emergence of new tools for performing NLP, the barriers of application of the approach 
are being lowered and there may similarly arise an imperative for safety managers in other industries to 
apply similar techniques in order to demonstrate compliance with best practice. 
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